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CONCERNING PROFESSOR WOODBRIDGE'S "COMMENT"

IN reviewing Professor Woodbridge's generous criticisms of my paper on "Matter and Energy," it is dawning upon me that a sort of esthetic attraction that I feel for the word "practical" has led me to use this word freely, here and elsewhere, in a sense close to its derivative meaning, and that I have completely overlooked the difficulties it might have for one who, like Professor Woodbridge, sees it in the light of its rôle in epistemological controversy. Thus with respect to his first quotation (pp. 373-4) if "practical" merely means, as I intend, "related to acting," it could only be applied to values if they were "discovered," "real" and "relevant." I am not sure, however, but what I agree with him that it would be well to omit the adjective in this instance.

I am not so sure, however, about the following sentence: "It appears rather to be that all distinctions in the subject-matter of knowledge are relevant to the fact of knowing and not to the subject-matter itself" (p. 375). They are relevant, I believe, to the kind of interaction that takes place between the knower, an organism, and the known, the physical world. Perhaps this is the same thing as "the fact of knowing," but I feel an epistemological shadow on this latter phrase that gives me pause. I was interested in emphasizing this situation in which knowing takes place and the contribution of all its actual factors to the resulting knowledge.

The difficulty seems to have carried over in Professor Woodbridge's mind to his next quotation (p. 376). I confess the second paragraph of his criticism puzzles me. I asserted that "resting-points in analysis are determined by the needs of human action. . . ." He comments that "not all are so determined" (p. 377). Perhaps I should have been more explicit. The "resting-points of analysis" mean to me here "the objects denoted by our scientific conceptions" and I was trying to say that any particular selection of such objects in our sciences results from the nature of the physical world and the human organism. I do not approve my own use of the word "need" here and should like to substitute "conditions." I see no objection to the word "human" for it is the sciences we have that I am interested in.

And this is closely related to the difficulty that Professor Woodbridge finds with the end of my paper (note 3). I never intended to imply that it is "simply because scientists or 'we' select, that values can be selected and distinguished." I agree perfectly with him that "they are selected and distinguished by other means also," and should have no objection to his instances of the plant or the river. But for the purposes of this paper, I was interested in certain specific selections that lie at the basis of a special science. I did mean,

however, by my example of the organism transparent to solids that although it is the same world that is mapped or from which selections are made, the mapping or the selecting could be made from such different points of view that, to differently constituted organisms, one selection might be of value and the other not. The plant and the river are in the same world, but if each had a science that mapped that world from the point of view implied by its activities, I think it might be a little difficult, although it is not inconceivable, for each to understand the other's map.

I do not believe that Professor Woodbridge will be in any deep disagreement with these explanations and my only reason for supplementing his remarks is that it is a question of making clear a certain type of metaphysical analysis in which we both believe profoundly, whether or not we shall be able to bring our conclusions together now or in the future.

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ON THE FUNCTION OF VISUAL IMAGERY AND ITS MEASUREMENT FROM INDIVIDUAL REPORTS

SOME years ago in this JOURNAL I presented evidence that individuals who reported themselves as capable of calling up clear and vivid imagery or objects did not differ appreciably in the accuracy of their judgments of numbers or magnitudes from memory, from individuals reporting little or no power to call up clear and vivid images.

It is of some interest to know whether the same holds good when the judgments are of *relative* magnitude or proportion; and I have recently secured data on this point, by the following method: Students of Teachers College and Barnard College who had estimated their imagery of their breakfast-tables and of an often-seen face were requested to tell what per cent. the length of Schermerhorn Hall is of the total 120th-Street width of the Columbia University campus. The question was made entirely clear, and the students were encouraged to imagine themselves as standing on 120th Street facing the campus, and to picture the building in question as it stands so as to be able to see how much of the campus's width its length took up in their visual image of it.

The results for the 115 reported "best" visualizers and the 122 reported worst visualizers, representing roughly the top and bottom thirds as reported, were as follows: